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INTRODUCTION
"I've got it....They can get ittoo.

'

This attitude, it is believed, helped

contribute to the dramatic spread of AIDS during the early days of the
* B.A., The University ofTexas at Austin, 1994; J.D., with honors, Drake University,
1999. Associate, Murray, Jankins & Noble, Des Moines, IA. The author would like to thank
Professor Keith Miller of the Drake University Law School for his guidance and inspiration in
developing this article.
1. RANDY SHiLTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLmCS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS
EPIDEMC 200 (1988).
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epidemic. 2 More recently, Nushawn Williams allegedly infected at least ten
people with HIV,3 as a result of his continuous promiscuity despite the
knowledge that he was HIV positive.4 These examples, hopefully, are rare and
extreme cases. The growing concern that some individuals infected with HIV
might disregard the risk that their condition poses to others, however, has led
to new legislative proposals that attempt to curb the spread of HIV-AIDS by
criminalizing certain behaviors related to the transmission of HIV.'
Because of the unique nature of the HIV-AIDS disease, traditional
criminal laws, such as those against assault or attempted murder, are
considered an ineffective means of punishing those who attempt to spread HIV
to others or engage in conduct likely to spread the virus. 6 Public health
statutes, such as those originally enacted to control syphilis' or other
contagious diseases, are also considered an ineffective means of controlling the
spread of HIV because of the differences in how HIV is transmitted.$
Recognizing this, states have turned to HIV-specific statutes as "the newest
"9
means [of] attempting to curb the unyielding spread of [the] disease ...
One important impetus in the rise of HIV-specific statutes was the
passage of the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency
(CARE) Act of 1990.' o Under the CARE Act, a state's emergency AIDS relief
2.

See 8enerally id. (discussing the beginnings of the AIDS epidemic and the factors

contributing to its rise). Gaetan Dugas, known as Patient Zero, continued to engage in
promiscuous behavior after learning of his illness, infecting many others. Id.
3. See Trent T. Gegax, The AIDS Predator, Newsweek, Nov. 10, 1997, at 58.
4. See Jennifer Tanaka & Gregory Beals, The Victims' Stories, Newsweek, Nov. 10,
1997, at 55. Williams' practice was to engage in unprotected sex without informing partners of
his infection, and often trading sex for drugs. See Amy M. Decker, Criminalizing the Intentional
or Reckless Exposure to HIV: A Wake-up Call to Kansas. 46 U.KAN. L. REV. 333, 333-34

(1998) (citing the Newsweek articles).
5.

See Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission,

9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 351 (1990).
6. See Karen H. Lahey. The New Line of Defense: Criminal HIV Transmission Laws,
1 SYRACUSE J.LEGIS. & POL'Y 85, 86 (1995). The article discusses four problems presented

by using traditional criminal law provisions to prosecute individuals for criminal transmission
of HIV: (1) the asymptomatic stage of HIV makes it likely that some individuals will not know
they are infected; (2) the disease is not easily transmitted; (3) other means of transmission may
yet be discovered; (4) the HIV-AIDS epidemic generally affects high risk groups, and not the
general population. See id.
7. See Stephen V. Kenney, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons From History
and a Model For the Future, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L & PoucY 245, 247 (1992).
8. See Lahey, supra note 6, at 87.
9. See id.at 85.
10. The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Act's
purpose is to provide emergency assistance to areas disproportionately affected by the HIV
epidemic and to provide financial assistance to states to develop and coordinate essential HIV
services. Id. § 2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300ff).
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grants are contingent upon showing that the state's laws are capable of
prosecuting individuals who inflict or expose others to HIV." Enacting HIV
specific statutes that criminalize the exposure of the virus to others is a means
of satisfying the CARE Act requirements. 2 Today, a majority of states have
passed some sort of HIV- specific criminal provision, and almost half have
enacted statutes which prohibit some conduct related to transmission, such as
blood and organ donation, or certain sexual activity.13
This article discusses the criminalization of HIV transmission and its
implications. Part II of this article provides a general overview of the laws,
while Part III is a detailed analysis of the specific statutes of the sixteen states
with criminal transmission statutes relating to sexual activity. 4 Part IV
discusses the problem of vertical transmission of HIV as it relates to criminal
transmission statutes. Finally, Part V of this article presents an alternative
statutory proposal that could eliminate much of the vagueness and controversy
surrounding the current laws.

I. HIV TRANSMISSION STATUTES
In recommending HIV-specific statutes, the Presidential Commission on
the Human Immunodeficiency Syndrome Epidemic concluded that such laws
are an effective means of holding others accountable for conduct that creates
a risk to others of contacting HIV. 5 According to the Commission, these
statutes "provide clear notice of socially unacceptable standards of behavior
specific to the HIV epidemic and can [tailor] punishment to the specific crime
of HIV transmitting behavior.' 6 As will be discussed later, the statutory
approaches taken by the states in addressing this problem can vary greatly.
There are, however, certain general traits that are found in most, if not all, of
the IlV specific statutes that have been enacted.
11. See Kenney, supra note 7, at 247 (citing § 2647 of the CARE Act).
12. See id. In addition to HIV specific statutes, the requirement may be satisfied
through traditional criminal law statutes or public offense statutes incorporating HIV infection
into the definition of sexually transmitted disease, provided the statutes are sufficient to allow
for prosecution of activity that risks HIV transmission. See. id. at 263.
13. For an analysis of all state laws dealing with HIV, see Paul Barron, et al., State

Statutes Dealing With HIVandAIDS: A ComprehensiveState-by-State Summary, 5 LAW& SEX.
1(1995). Overall, there are more than twenty states with HIV transmission statutes, prohibiting
at least the donation of blood products. See id.
14. This paper analyzes the statutory approach of sixteen states: Arkansas, California,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
15. See Hermann, supra note 5, at 352 (citing the Report of the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic).
16. Id. at 370.

NORTHERN ILNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

All of the statutes make it an offense for an HIV-infected person to
engage in behavior that is known to transmit HIV."7 Some of the statutes are
very broadly drawn, while others are very specific in describing the conduct
that is prohibited."8 The proscribed behavior is generally classified as a
felony, 9 and punishable through fines or imprisonment." In addition, many
HIV-specific statutes that criminalize sexual transmission include a provision
that makes it an affirmative defense that the behavior took place with the full
disclosure of one party's HIV status and the consent of the other party.2 ' Other
statutes make lack of disclosure or lack of informed consent an element of the
crime itself.22
The statutes generally require that the defendant have knowledge of his
HJV status at the time of the offense.' The exact nature of the knowledge
requirement can vary among the statutes,U but the effect remains the same. If
the defendant is unaware of his or her HIV status, he cannot be charged under
the statute.' This requirement is often criticized for being a deterrent to HIV
testing, as some people might resist being tested for fear that knowledge of a
positive test result makes them susceptible to criminal prosecution.' Arguably,
the HIV-specific transmission laws have created a tension with the public
policy encouraging testing.27 On the one hand, voluntary HIV testing is widely

17. See id. at 371.
18. See Michael L. Closen, et al., Criminalizationof an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and
CriminalExposureLaws, 46 ARK. L. REV. 921,941-42 (1994). For example, the Illinois statute

prohibits any intimate contact, while North Dakota prohibits sexual activity of certain types.
Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2 (West 1998) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-2017 (1997).
19.

See Hermann, supranote 6, at 371. But cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (1999)

(it is a misdemeanor for a person infected with a sexually transmitted disease to expose another.
The statute does not specifically mention HIV, but it presumably is included as a sexually

transmitted disease).
20. See, e.8., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1999) (fine of $6,000 or eleven year
imprisonment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (West Supp. 1999) (fine of $5,000 or ten year
imprisonment).
21. See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17
(1997); NEV. REv. STAT. § 201.205 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1998).
22. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1999); CAL HEALTH &
SAFETYCODE § 120291 (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE. ANN. § 26-2910 (c)(1) (Harrison 1998).

23. See Closen et al., supra note 18, at 964.
24. See. e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2 (West 1998) (requiring only that
defendants know they are infected); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1999)
(requiring a positive test result).
25. See Closen et al., supra note 18, at 964-65.
26. See id. at 965.
27. See id. at 964.
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encouraged by public health authorities. 2 "On the other hand, the state
punishes people if they do become aware of their status by using [it] against
them." 29
Finally, the conduct that is prohibited by most of these statutes is not the
actual transmission of HIV, but rather the exposure to HIV.3" This is because
a requirement of actual HIV transmission would be very difficult, if not
impossible, to prove. 3 Proving a case of actual transmission of HIV would
require a showing of several facts. First, a prosecutor must show that the
victim was not infected with HIV at the time of the offense.3 2 Second, it must
be shown that the victim did not engage in any other activity that created a risk
of transmission until HIV testing was complete.33 Third, it must be shown that
the victim actually did become infected with HIV.34 The period of time that
elapses between the exposure to the virus and the time that it can be detected
in the blood creates significant causation problems in proving the actual
transmission of HIV.?
]]. SPECIFIC STATE APPROACHES

Although there are several general elements that nearly all HIV specific
statutes have in common, there are also wide variances among the statutes. The
wording of an individual statute and the types of conduct that it directly or
implicitly prohibits can have a great impact on how the statute is perceived.
Despite some of the similarities among them, the HIV specific statutes enacted
by state legislatures can vary greatly.
A. ARKANSAS

Arkansas enacted its HIV exposure law in 1989.36 That statute prohibits
conduct that exposes another person to the human immunodeficiency virus,"

28. See Michael L. Closen, The Arkansas Criminal HIV Exposure Law: Statutory
Issues, Public Policy Concerns, and Constitutional Objections, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 47, 48

(1993).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Closen et al., supra note 18, at 964-65.
See Closen, supra note 28, at 49.
See id.
See id.
See id.

34. See id.
35. See Michael L. Closen & Jeffrey S. Deutschman, A Proposal to Repeal the Illinois
HIV Transmission Statute, 78 ILL B. J. 592, 594 (1990).
36. See Closen, supra note 28, at 47.
37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1999).
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and makes it a Class A felony to do so.3" Arkansas' statute recognizes that a
person afflicted with AIDS or who has tested positive for HIV "is infectious
to others through the exchange of body fluids during sexual intercourse and
through the parenteral transfer of blood or blood products and under these
circumstances is a danger to the public." 39 For this reason, the statute seeks
to prohibit certain acts that create a risk of transferring the virus to others. It
should be noted that the statute criminalizes the conduct of "exposing" another
to HIV, and does not require actual transmission of the virus.40 This eliminates
the causation problems that would result from a requirement of transmission,
and ensures that the focus remains on1 the conduct of the defendant, and not the
conduct or condition of the victim.4
The statute further provides that a person has committed the offense of
exposing another to HIV if the person knows he has tested positive for HIV
and parenterally transfers his blood to another person, or engages in an act of
"sexual penetration with another person...,, 2 without first informing the other
consent.4 3
person of his HIV status and obtaining the other person's informed
Subsection (c) of the statute provides the definition of sexual penetration."
Under the definition, sexual penetration may consist of the acts generally
believed to create the greatest risk of transfer, 4' as well as "any other intrusion
... of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person's body." The statute further states that emission
of semen is not required.4 7 A class A felony conviction in Arkansas carries a
prison term of six to thirty years.4
The Arkansas statute has received a great deal of criticism regarding some
of its components.49 The testing requirement of the statute is viewed as

38. Id. § 5-14-23 (d).
39. Id. § 5-14-23 (a).
40. See Closen, supra note 28, at 49.
41. See, e.g. Weaver v. State, 939 S.W.2d 316 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that HIV
status of the victim's other sexual partners was irrelevant to Weaver's conviction under
Arkansas' criminal exposure statute). The decision was affirmed on appeal in Weaver v. State,
No. CR 97-690, 1998 WL 401739, (Ark. 1998).
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (b) (Michie 1999).
43. See id.
44. See id. § 5-14-123 (c).
45. See id. Specifically, the definition includes "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus,
fellatio, (and] anal intercourse." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Closen, supra note 28, at 52.
49. See generally, Michael L. Closen, The Arkansas Criminal HIV Exposure Law:
Statutory Issues, Public Policy Concerns, and Constitutional Objections, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES
47 (discussing problems with the Arkansas statute).
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incomplete, as it does not incorporate the entire regime of HIV testing and
guard against the chance of obtaining false positive results. 50 HIV testing is
a two-step process, and when both steps of the test are employed, a positive
result is more than 99% accurate.51 Because it requires only a positive result
rather than a "confirmed positive," the Arkansas statute is considered
ineffective in not accurately reflecting HIV testing capabilities. 2 The statute
is further criticized because only a positive test result and not a clinical
diagnosis of AIDS will satisfy the knowledge requirement." This means that
a person who is symptomatic of AIDS and fits the clinical definition of the
disease, but has never actually undergone HIV testing cannot be charged under
the statute. 5" As a result, much of the risky conduct that the statute seeks to
prevent is not addressed in the statute. " In addition, the only knowledge
requirement in the statute is that of testing. 5 It is not required that the offender
be aware of how HIV is transmitted or have knowledge that her conduct is
creating such a risk.5 To be a more effective and appropriate criminal statute,
"[a] defendant should also be required to know that he is actually exposing
another person to the virus at the time of the criminal act."5"
The statute has also been criticized for the definition of sexual
penetration.59 By allowing for the intrusion "of any object '" to classify as
sexual penetration as defined in the Arkansas statute, the legislature has left
open the possibility that many activities that carry no risk of transmission are
criminalized."' For example, the broad definition may be construed as
prohibiting even the use of sex toys by HIV-infected people.62 Further, conduct
that is not sexual in nature, such as a vaginal or rectal exam by an HIVinfected doctor, might fall under the Arkansas definition of sexual

50. See id. at 48.
51. See id. The two-step process for HIV testing involves the ELISA screening,
followed by a more sophisticated Western Blot assay test. Because of the danger of false
positives when only ELISA is used, the Western Blot is used to obtain more accurate results.
Id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 48-9.
54. See id. at 49.
55. See id.

56. See id.

57. See id.
58. See Marcia S. Cook, Note, Criminal Liabilityfor Attempting to Inflict the AIDS
Virus: Possibilitiesin Arkansas' Future,45 ARK. L. REV. 505, 526 (1992).
59. See Closen, supra note 28, at 51.
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (c) (Michie Supp. 1999).
61. See Closen, supra note 28, at 51.
62. See id.
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penetration.6 3 Finally, even so-called "safe sex" practices are prohibited under
the statute."
The Arkansas law is also considered deficient in its language regarding
5
the victim and lack of disclosure to the victim." Nowhere does the statute say
that the victim of the exposure must be HIV negative." Therefore, an HIVinfected individual can still be charged under the statute even if the person
7
they expose to HIV was already infected with the virus. It should also be
noted that Arkansas, unlike other states, does not make consent of the victim
an affirmative defense." The result is that the victim's lack of informed
consent becomes an element of the offense that must be proven by the
69
prosecution rather than a defense asserted by the defendant.
The constitutionality of the Arkansas law is also of concern." It has been

asserted that the law is unconstitutionally overbroad because the language of
the statute "encompasses activities which do not really risk HIV exposure or
7
transmission, and which therefore are not criminal. ' ' It is further asserted that
the law should be rendered unconstitutionally vague because the provisions
could be drafted more specifically.' Despite these concerns, there have been
no constitutional claims asserted against the Arkansas statute and it remains
in effect as drafted.
B. CALIFORNIA

California passed a law in 1998 prohibiting unprotected sexual activity by
persons infected with HIV.' The statute makes it a felony offense, punishable

by imprisonment of three, five, or eight years, for a person to "expose[s]

another to the human immunodeficiency virus by engaging in unprotected
sexual activity."'7 The law requires that at the time of the act, the infected

63.

See id.

64. See id. The statute specifically states that emission of semen is not required with
the offense of sexual penetration, so that even sexual intercourse with the use of a condom falls
under the prohibitions. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (c) (Michie Supp. 1999).
65. See Closen, supranote 28, at 52.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 52. See, e.g., 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2 (West 1998); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (Michie 1997) (stating that disclosure is an affirmative defense).
69. See Closen, supra note 28, at 52.
70. See id. at 54.
71. Id. at54.
72. See id.
66.
67.
68.

73.

74.

See CAL. HEALTH

& SAFETY CODE

Id. at § 120291 (a).

§ 120291 (West Supp. 1999).
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person "knows ...
that he or she is infected with HIV." 71 California's law
further requires that a person act with "the specific intent to infect the other
person with HIV. '7 61 The statute also includes provisions designed to protect
the identity of victims of the crime."
Subsection (b) of the statute provides the definitions. 7 1 Sexual activity is
clearly defined as including vaginal or anal intercourse by an infected male,
as well as receptive consensual vaginal intercourse by an infected female with
a male partner." The definition further includes receptive consensual anal
intercourse with a male partner by an infected man or woman. 0 The subsection
defines unprotected sexual activity as "sexual activity without the use of a
condom."'"
The California law contains several interesting provisions. First, it is an
essential element of the offense that the defendant engaged in unprotected
sexual activity.8 2 Thus, unlike other statutes that make it an affirmative defense
if safe sex is practiced, 3 California places the burden on the prosecution to
prove that it was not. It is also an element of the offense that the person
charged did not disclose their HIV status to the victim." In other states, it is
an affirmative defense that the conduct took place after full disclosure." Even
more problematic is the requirement that a person act with the specific intent
to infect another with HIV. The law states that a person's "knowledge of his
or her HIV-positive status, without additional evidence, shall not be sufficient
to prove specific intent."'8 Thus, reckless behavior creating a risk of infection
will not rise to the level of a punishable offense under the California law. The
state would presumably have to show some malice on the part of the defendant
to meet the statutory requirements. This burden may make the California law
very difficult to successfully prosecute.87
75. Id.
76. Id.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. § 120291 (c).

Id. § 120291 (b).
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id. § 120291 (a).

83. Compare CAL HEALTH &SAf;E'YCoDE § 120291 (a) (WestSupp. 1999) with N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (1997).
84. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (a) (West Supp. 1999).
85. See, e.g., N.D. CENT.CODE § 12.1-20-17 (Michie 1997); IOWACODE §709C.1 (5)

(West Supp. 2000).
86.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (a) (West Supp. 1999).

87. Oklahoma isthe only other state to include an intent requirement inits law, and the
requirement has received a great deal of criticism for placing too great a burden on the
prosecution. See discussion of Oklahoma law, infra part II N.
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California's statutory definition of sexual activity also presents problems.

The definition clearly states what conduct is prohibited, and is limited to
activity that is a proven means of HIV transmission. Thus, the statute is not
8
likely to face challenges that it is unconstitutionally overbroad." The
definition of sexual activity, however, is underinclusive. The statute makes no
reference to, and therefore does not prohibit, any type of oral-genital sexual
contact.89 Such conduct can transmit IIV90 and should be included in the
definition. This omission undermines the overall effectiveness of the statute
in controlling the spread of HIV-AIiDS.
C. FLORIDA

In Florida, it is unlawful for a person "who has human immunodeficiency
virus ... to have sexual intercourse with any person, unless such other person
has been informed of the presence of the sexually transmissible disease and
has consented to the sexual intercourse."'" The law requires that a person
"knows that he or she is infected with [HIV] and ... has been informed that he
or she may communicate this disease to another person through sexual
93
intercourse."9' Violation of the law is classified as a third degree felony. A
third degree felony carries a prison term of up to five years," and/or a $5,000
fine.9" Multiple violations of the law become a first degree felony. 96 A first
degree felony is punishable by up to thirty years in prison,' and/or a fine of
$10,000.98
The Florida statute offers no definition of the knowledge requirement, but
does state that a person must know their HIV status and that the person must
have been informed of the risk of communicating it to others through sexual

88. See discussion of Arkansas law, supra part II A; discussion of Illinois law, infra
part IIF.
89. Compare CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (b)() (West Supp. 1999) with
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (Michie 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (1) (West Supp.
1999). Both North Dakota and South Carolina include oral contact in their laws. Id.
90. See ARTHUR S. LEONARD ET AL, AIDS LAW AND POLICY 26 (2d ed. 1995).
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (2) (West Supp. 2000). Subsection (1) of the statute
makes it a misdemeanor for a person infected with a sexually transmitted disease other than
HIV-AIDS. such as gonorrhea or syphilis, to engage in intercourse. Id.
92. Id.
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.34 (5) (West Supp. 2000).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (3)(d) (West Supp. 2000).
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.083 (1)(c) (West Supp. 2000).
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.34 (5) (West Supp. 2000).
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (3)(b) (West Supp. 2000).
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.083 (1)(b) (West Supp. 2000).
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contact." This implies that a person must have received positive test results
from a medical test for 1IV or perhaps a medical diagnosis of AIDS, as
counseling about the dangers of the disease are likely to accompany a
diagnosis by a medical professional. Even so, the Florida statute could have
been drafted to more clearly explain the knowledge requirement. Additionally,
the language requiring that one be informed of the possibility of transmitting
the disease to others appears to require some appreciation of the risk involved
in their conduct, and a disregard of that risk by engaging in sexual intercourse
despite knowing the dangers. This could be construed as requiring the intent
to infect others, leading to problems in proof and enforceability." °
More problematic is the failure to define sexual intercourse.'' The statute
may be construed as prohibiting only male-female vaginal intercourse. If so,
the statute does not prohibit other forms of sexual contact that present a
significant risk of HIV transmission." 2 If the law is intended to cover all
forms of sexual contact that carry a risk of transmitting HIV, it could have
been drafted to say this. The current version of the law leaves doubt as to
exactly what conduct is prohibited.
D. GEORGIA

The law in Georgia makes it a felony for an infected person to knowingly
engage in sexual intercourse, or perform or submit to any sexual act "involving
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another person."'0 3 The
offense requires that a person act "after obtaining knowledge of being infected
with HIV," and without disclosing to the other person that they are infected
prior to the sexual act. '" The law also contains provisions prohibiting HIV
infected people from engaging in prostitution,'0 5 sharing hypodermic needles
or syringes,"° and donating blood, blood products, body fluids and body

99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (2) (West Supp. 2000).
100. See discussion of Oklahoma law, infra part II N; R. Brian Leech, Criminalizing
Sexual Transmission of HIV: Oklahoma'sIntentionalTransmissionStatute: Unconstitutional
or Merely Unenforceable?, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 687, 692 (1993).
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (2) (West Supp. 2000).
102. For example, receptive anal intercourse was the first recognized risk factor for HIV,
and presents the greatest risk of transmission. See ARTHUR S. LEONARD, ETAL, AIDS LAW AND
PoucY 27 (2d ed. 1995). Oral-genital contact also carries some risk. Id. at 26.
103. GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-5-60 (c)(1) (Lexis 1999).
104.

105.
106.

Id.

Id. § 16-5-60 (c)(3).
Id. § 16-5-60 (c)(2).
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organs. 7 Conviction under the statute is punishable by imprisonment for not
more than ten years.' °8
Georgia's law states that for a person to be charged under the statute, he
must have "obtain[ed] knowledge of being infected with HIV."' 9 The statute,
however, does not explain how this knowledge must be obtained. It can be
construed to mean that a person must have either received a medical diagnosis
of AIDS, or received positive test results from an HIV test. The statute could
have been more effectively drafted to say this.
The statute is similar to that of California in that it is an element of the
offense charged that the HIV infected person did not disclose his HIV status
to the victim prior to the act. " ' This places the burden on the prosecution to
prove lack of disclosure, and makes the offense harder to prosecute than many
of its counterparts that make disclosure an affirmative defense."' One strength
in Georgia's law, however, is that it eliminates the problem of
underinclusiveness found in the California law. The statute does include oralgenital contact in the conduct it prohibits." 2 More importantly, the conduct
that is prohibited in part I of the statute is limited to conduct that actually
results in transmission of HIV," 3 creating little likelihood that the statute could
be found to be unconstitutionally overbroad.
E. IDAHO

In 1988, Idaho enacted a statute that prohibits the transfer of body fluids
that may contain HIV." 4 The statute provides that any person who exposes
another in any manner with the "intent to infect" them with HIV is guilty of
a felony." 5 The statute also makes it a felony for a person to "transfer or
attempt to transfer any of his body fluid"" to another person if that person
knows that he or she is afflicted with AIDS or HIV." 7' A conviction under the

107.

108.
109.
110.

Id. § 16-5-60 (c)(5).

Id § 16-5-60 (c)(1).
Id. § 16-5-60 (c).
Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (c)(1) (Lexis 1999) with CAL HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 120291 (a) (West Supp. 1999).
111. See, e.g. IOWA CODE § 709C.1 (5) (West Supp. 2000).
112. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (c)(1) (Lexis 1999).
113. The statute includes only vaginal and anal intercourse and oral-genital contact, all
of which can result in transmission of HIV. See ARTHUR S. LEONARD ET AL, AIDS LAW AND
POuCY 24-26 (2d ed. 1995).
114. IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Michie 1998).
115. Id. § 39-608 (1).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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statute carries a prison term of up to fifteen years, and/or a fine of up to
$5,000.11,

It is an offense under the Idaho statute to act with the intent to infect
another with HIV, 9 but intent is not a requirement for all charges under the
law. Any person that knows he or she is infected with HIV and transfers or
attempts to transfer his or her bodily fluids can be convicted under the Idaho
statute."2 The Idaho law, therefore, differs from other statutes of its kind that
require a showing of intent for any conviction. 121 This requirement leads to
problems of proof and enforceability. 2 By allowing for other situations that
may result in criminal charges, the Idaho law has greater enforceability, and
is arguably more effective in controlling conduct that is likely to spread HIV.
Subsection (2) of the statute provides definitions. "Body fluid" is defined
n
to include semen, blood, saliva, vaginal secretions, breast milk, and urine."
This subsection also defines "transfer" as used in the statute as engaging in
sexual activity involving genital, oral, or anal contact. " It should be noted that
the statute includes saliva and urine in its definition of body fluid, neither of
which has been shown to be a means of transmission of the Virus, although
HIV is present in both fluids. This potentially makes the Idaho statute
susceptible to charges of overbreadth, although the definition of transfer,
including only sexual activity at least insofar as contact between individuals
is concerned, helps to ensure that it will not be misapplied to contact involving
no risk of transmission. Also problematic is the inclusion of breast milk in the
definition of "body fluids."'" Breastfeeding can result in the transmission of
2
HIV, " but Idaho's definition of transfer does not include breastfeeding '
Subsection (3) of the Idaho law provides that it is an affirmative defense
n
that the sexual activity took place after full disclosure by the accused." This
takes some burden off of the prosecution by not including lack of disclosure

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(a) (West Supp. 1999); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. XXI, § 1192. 1(A) (West Supp. 2000).
122. R. Brian Leech, CriminalizingSexual Transmissionof HIV: Oklahoma'sIntentional
TransmissionStatute: Unconstitutional or Merely Unenforceable?, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 687, 692
(1993).
123. IDAHO CODE § 39-608(2)(a) (Michie 1998).
124. Id. § 39-608(2)(b).
125. Id. § 39-608(2)(a).
126. See Closen, supra note 28, at 49.
127. IDAHO CODE § 39-608(2)(b) (Michie 1998).
128. Id. § 39-603(3)(a).
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as an element of the crime itself' 29 By making the state's burden of proof
easier to meet, the Idaho law may be more enforceable than many of its
3
counterparts.1

0

F. ILLINOIS

Illinois enacted one of the most controversial HIV transmission statutes

in 1989."' The statute has been the subject of a great deal of criticism about

its construction and the ambiguity of some of its provisions.' It is a class 2
felony in Illinois for a person to commit the criminal transmission of HIV. 133
Criminal transmission of HIV occurs when a person, knowing that they are

infected with HIV, "engages in intimate contact with another,"' 3 4 or "transfers.
... blood, tissue, semen, organs, or other potentially infectious body fluids...
to another."' 35

Subsection (b) defines intimate contact as "the exposure of the body of

one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result in
the transmission of HIV." 6 The statute further states that actual infection with

HIV need not occur for a person to have committed criminal transmission of
37
HIV.

Finally, it is an affirmative defense if the exposed person knew the

defendant was infected with HIV, knew the activity might result in infection,
and consented to the activity. 38
The Illinois law has been the subject of a great deal of criticism

39

as well

as constitutional challenges."'° One criticism of the law is that it requires that

129. Compare IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1998) with CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
120291(a) (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(c) (Michie Supp. 1999).
130. See, e.g., discussion of Arkansas law, suprapart I A; discussion of California law,
supra part If B.
131. See Closen & Deutschman, supra note 35, at 593.
132. See generally Closen & Deutschman, supra note 35 (describing problems with the
Illinois statute).
133. 720 IL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(e) (West 1998).
134. Id. § 5112-16.2(a)(1).
135. Id. § 5/12-16.2(a)(2). The statute specifically provides that the body fluids be
transferred for "transfusion, transplantation, insemination, or other administration .
Id.
136. Id. § 5/12-16.2(b).
137. See id. § 5/12-16.2(c).
138. See id. § 5/12-16.2(d).
139. See generally Closen & Deutschman, supra note 35 (describing problems with the
Illinois statute). But cf Amy M. Decker, Criminalizing the Intentional or Reckless Exposure to
HIV: A Wake-up Call to Kansas, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 333 (1998) (praising the Illinois statute
as a model HIV-specific statute).
140. See e.g., People v. Russell, 630 N.E.2d 794 (il. 1994) (reversing Illinois trial court
decision that the law is unconstitutional).
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a person must know that they are infected with HIT,14 ' but offers no
explanation of whether actual knowledge, such as a positive test result, is
required, or if constructive knowledge, such as symptoms of the disease,
would suffice.14 1 With no definition of "knowledge" in the statute, the
possibility is left open that mere membership in a high-risk group might be
enough to constitute knowledge of infection. 43
The statute should also be criticized for prohibiting transfer of
"potentially infectious body fluids,"'" when many such fluids present no risk
of HIV transmission. For example, the virus is present in tears and saliva, but
neither has been shown to actually transmit HV.1'4 By failing to limit body
fluids only to those fluids that can actually result in transmission, the Illinois
statute is subject to very broad interpretations.' 4' It is doubtful that the drafters
intended for a "sweaty handshake or crying upon someone's shoulder"' 47 to be
a felony, but such interpretation appears possible given the way the statute is
worded. 48
Also to be criticized is the use of the phrase "could result in the
transmission of HiT'V4 9 in the statutory definition of intimate contact. This
might be interpreted as applying to any conduct that might, hypothetically,
result in transmission, rather than only the medically established routes of
transmission." S If the intention was for it to only apply to proven modes of
transmission, the statute could have been drafted in a less ambiguous way.'
It is this wording that has resulted in the Illinois law being challenged as
unconstitutionally vague. 52 In People v. Dempsey, the defendant asserted that
the statute fails to "clearly indicate what behavior is prohibited,"'5 and fails
to give notice as to what acts are prohibited. 54 This challenge failed, however,
as the court concluded that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to the defendant in the case. " The statute has further been upheld as
141.

720 ILL COMP.

146.

See id.

142.
143.
144.
145.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(a)

(West 1998).

See Closen & Deutschman, supra note 35, at 594.
See id.
720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(a)(2) (West 1998).
See Closen & Deutschman, supra note 35, at 595.
Id.
See id.
720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(b) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
See Closen, supra note 35, at 596.
Id.
People v. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d 208 (I11.App. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 222.
Id.

155. Id. at 223. In the case, the defendant Dempsey inserted his penis into the victim's
mouth and ejaculated semen. Because this is a method of exposure that could clearly result in
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"being sufficiently clear and explicit so that a person of ordinary intelligence
need not have to guess at its meaning or application.' 56
G. IOWA

The Iowa law prohibiting the criminal transmission of HIV went into
effect on July 1, 1998.15? In Iowa, it is a class B felony for a person to commit
the crime of transmission of HIV. "' A class B felony is punishable by up to
twenty-five years in prison.5 9 The law requires that a person know that his or
her HIV status is positive," and that the person "engage in intimate contact
with another person,"' 61 or "[t]ransfers ... blood, tissue, semen, organs, or
other potentially infectious bodily fluids.., to another person....
Intimate contact is defined in subsection (2) as "the intentional exposure
of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that
' The
could result in the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus." 163
law makes it an affirmative defense if the person exposed to the virus knew of
the other person's infection, knew that the exposure might result in
transmission of the virus, and consented to the exposure with that
knowledge."' The law does not require that an actual infection with HIV
occur for a person to be charged with criminal transmission.'
The law appears to have been modeled on the Illinois HIV transmission
statute, as the wording of the two laws is nearly identical.'" The Iowa
definition of intimate contact, like Illinois', covers any conduct that could
result in transmission of IV. 6 7 This presents the same potential for the Iowa
law to be interpreted as applying to conduct that is not a proven mode of
transmission. The Iowa definition does require that the conduct be an

transmission, the court held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality

of the act as it applied to others. id
156. People v. Russell, 630 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ill. 1994).
157. Jason Clayworth, AuthoritiesAsk ForHelp in HIV Case, DES MOINES REG., Oct.
31, 1998, at IM.
158. IOWA CODE § 709C.1(3) (1999).
159. IOWA CODE § 902.9(1) (1999).
160. IOWA CODE § 709C.l(l) (1999).

161. Id. § 709C.1(1)(a) (1999).
162. Id. § 709C.1(l)(b) (1999).
163. Id. § 709C.1(2)(a) (1999).
164. Id. § 709C.1(5) (1999).
165. Id. § 709C.1(3) (1999).
166. CompareIOWA CODE § 709C.1 (1999) with 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2
(West 1998).
167. CompareIOWA CODE § 709C. 1 (1999) with 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2
(West 1998).
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"intentionalexposure"'" of the bodily fluid. The inclusion of the extra word
should help to ensure that an inadvertent exposure of a bodily fluid does not
result in a charge under the law. It is questionable, however, how much of an
improvement this really is. The Iowa statute also prohibits the transfer of
"potentially infectious bodily fluids,"'69 making it identical to the Illinois
statute in this respect.' Thus, the Iowa statute is subject to the same
potentially broad application as the Illinois law, including the possibility that
a sweaty handshake might be considered a felony.''
The knowledge requirement of the Iowa law also presents problems. Iowa
requires that a person have knowledge that his HIV status is positive."7 This
might be construed as requiring a positive test result, but that is not entirely
clear based on the way it is worded. Even if a positive test is required, the Iowa
statute suffers from the same weakness of the Arkansas statute by not requiring
a confirmed positive test.'" Another problem is that the Iowa statute does not
explain whether a medical diagnosis of AIDS will satisfy the knowledge
requirement. 4 These weaknesses appear to make the Iowa law susceptible to
the same criticisms and constitutional challenges that other state statutes have
faced.
The first prosecutions under the Iowa law were brought in October
1998. '7 The charges emphasized that actual transmission of HIV is not a
requirement under the statute. It is unknown and irrelevant to a charge whether
the victims have been infected with the virus or have even been tested.7 6 In
January 1999, the first Iowan charged under the law pleaded guilty to criminal
transmission of HIV and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. " Since
then, the Iowa law has continued to be enforced with the maximum penalty.17
In November 2000, another man was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison

168.

169.
170.

IOWA CODE § 709C. 1(2)(b) (1999) (emphasis added).
Id. § 709C.1(1)(b) (1999).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(a)(2) (West 1998).

See discussion of Illinois law, supra part II F.
See IOWA CODE § 709C.1(1) (1999).
See discussion of Arkansas law, suprapart IIA.
See IOWA CODE § 709C.1(1) (1999).
See Charles Bullard, Dubuque Prosecutes2 UnderNew AIDS Law, DEs MoaNEs
12, 1998, at 5M.
176. See Clayworth, supra note 157, at IM.
177. Charles Bullard, AIDS Victim to Go to Prison, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 26, 1999,
at IM. The defendant was also charged with second-degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts
with a child for having oral and anal sex with an 11- year- old boy. The sexual abuse charge was

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
REG., Nov.

dropped as part of the plea agreement. Id.
178. Man is lmprisonedforGiving Woman HIV, DES MouNES REG., November 21, 2000
at 4B.
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after pleading guilty to criminal transmission of IV.' 79 The defendant was
involved in a consensual relationship, but had not informed the woman of his
HIV status."m Despite the victim's request for leniency, the judge sentenced
An Iowa prosecutor
the defendant to prison at the prosecutor's urging.'
8
2
and predicts that more people will be
views the new law as "necessary,'
charged with criminal transmission of HIV. 8 3
H. LOUISIANA

The HIV exposure statute in Louisiana contains some of the same
elements of the other state statutes as well as provisions that are unique to
Louisiana.'" The statute prohibits the act of intentionally exposing another to
any AIDS virus through sexual contact' or by any other "means or
contact," 6 without the knowing consent of the victim.'" The definition
section of the statute states that "means or contact" includes "spitting, biting,
stabbing with an AIDS contaminated object, or throwing of blood or other
bodily substances."'8 8 Conviction of the crime of intentional exposure to the
AIDS virus results in a fine of up to $5,000 and/or up to ten-years
imprisonment. 89

There are several potential problems with the Louisiana law as written.
The statute requires that one "intentionally expose"'9 another to the virus, but
does not explain what is meant by intentionally. The word has been read to
actually mean knowingly, therefore requiring that the offender was aware of
his HIV infection." Even then it is not clear whether the knowledge
requirement is knowledge of actual infection or knowledge of symptoms that

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. The victim requested that the defendant be given only probation so that they
could continue their relationship, but the prosecutor urged the maximum penalty, stating that
"the victim is going to die from the act of the defendant." Id.
182. Bullard, supra note 175, at 5M (quoting Dubuque County attorney Fred McCaw).
183. See id.
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1997). The statute includes enhanced
penalties if the exposed victim is a police officer, a provision not found in any other state. Id.
§ 14:43.5(C), (E).
185. Id. § 14:43.5(A).
186. Id. § 14:43.5(B).
187. Id. § 14:43.5(A)-(B).
188. Id. § 14:43.5(D)(1).
189. Id. § 14:43.5(E)(1).
190. Id. § 14:43.5(A).
191. See Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., Criminal Procedure, Developments in the Law 19861987, 48 LA. L. REV. 257, 281 (1987).
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would lead most people to believe they have AIDS. 192 The wording also

leaves room for argument that the offender must act knowingly with regard to
not only his infection, but also with regard to his conduct and the danger of
transmission." 9
Also troublesome is the failure of the statute to explain what is meant by
the words "sexual contact."'9 Clearly, the words apply to the forms of sexual
contact that are known to result in transmission of HIV, but there is potential
for a broader reading. For example, mouth-to-mouth kissing could be
regarded as a form of sexual contact but is not proven to be a mode of
transmission of HIV 95
A constitutional claim of vagueness has been asserted against the
Louisiana statute partly because of this wording.'" Despite acknowledging a
possibility that the terminology includes sexual acts not capable of
transmission, the court in State v. Gambarella concluded that the phrase
"unambiguously describes unlawful conduct with sufficient particularity and
clarity."'" It was also asserted in that case that the potential application to
conduct that cannot transmit the virus, such as kissing, rendered the statute
unconstitutionally overbroad.'" The court found no merit in this argument
because the statutory language encompassed the conduct of the defendant.'"
The exposure element of the statute was also challenged as applying to
activities that do not transmit the virus, but this vagueness challenge was also
rejected.' The use of the word expose, rather than transmit, ensures that the
element of the offense is creation of a risk, not actual infection.2"'
I. MICHIGAN

Michigan law makes it a felony for a person who has AIDS or knows they
are infected with HIV to engage in "sexual penetration" with another person
without first informing the other person of their condition. 2 Sexual

192.
193.

194.
195.

See id.
See id.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (B) (West 1997).
See Joseph, supra note 187, at 282.

196. See State v. Gambarella, 633 So.2d 595, 603 (La. Ct. App. 1993).

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. The defendant's conduct was sexual intercourse with a condom, which
apparently broke during intercourse. Id. at 599.
200. Id. at 602.
201. See Joseph, supra note 187, at 281; see also State v. Gambarella, 633 So.2d. 595,
602 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
202. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.5210(1) (West Supp. 1999).
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penetration is defined as including sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, oralgenital contact, or the intrusion of any object or part of a person's body into
the genital or anal openings of another person's body. 3 The emission of
semen is not required.'
The Michigan statute appears to contain some of the same flaws of other
state statutes. The statute requires that a person know that they are infected
with HIV, but does not offer any explanation of how this knowledge must be
obtained.2'5 This is similar to the Illinois statute in that it does not specify
whether the knowledge must be as a result of a positive HIV test, or by some
other means.' Although the Michigan statute is somewhat better drafted in
that it also provides for knowledge by actual diagnosis of AIDS,' 7 the lack of
a positive test requirement for HIV infection is problematic. It is also an
element of the crime that the defendant did not inform his victim of his status.
This places the burden on the prosecution to prove lack of disclosure.'
In addition, Michigan's definition of sexual penetration is virtually
identical to that in Arkansas.' Thus, Michigan's law also potentially applies
to many acts that carry no risk of transmission."' 0 Despite these flaws, the
Michigan statute has survived a constitutional challenge."' The statute was
challenged as unconstitutionally overbroad, but because the defendant's
conduct was clearly encompassed by the statutory language, the law was not
overbroad as applied to the defendant.2 The Michigan law was also upheld
as narrowly tailored to the state's compelling interest of discouraging the
spread of HIV.2"3 Because the law is narrowly tailored to this interest, it is not
unconstitutional for the Michigan statute to require infected persons to inform
potential partners of their infection before engaging in sexual penetration." 4

203. Id. § 333.5210(2).
204. Id. § 333.5210(2). The Michigan definition of sexual penetration is identical to that
of Arkansas. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1997).
205. MICH. Cow. LAws ANN. § 333.5210(1) (West 1999).
206. Compare MICH. COw. LAwsANN. § 333.5210(l) with 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/12-16.2 (West 1998).
207. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.5210(1) (West 1999).
208. Id.
209. Compare MiciH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.5210(2) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14123(c).
210. See discussion of Arkansas law, supra part II A.
211. See People v. Jensen, 556 N.W.2d 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
212. Jensen, 556 N.W.2d at 751. The Defendant engaged in unprotected consensual
sexual intercourse with her victim. Id. A person to whom a statute is constitutionally applied
may not challenge the law on grounds that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others. Id.
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1973)).
213. Jensen, 556 N.W.2d at 756.
214. Id. at 756-57.
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J. MISSOURI

Missouri's HIV statute makes it unlawful for an individual knowingly
infected with HIV to "act in a recless manner exposing another person to
' through contact with blood, semen, or vaginal
IV"215
fluid during the course
or oral, anal, or vaginal sexual intercourse.2 16 The offense requires that the

exposed party did not consent to being exposed to HIV.21 The statute also
includes a description of what evidence may be used to show that a person has
218
acted recklessly and created a risk of infecting another with IffV.
A person
has acted recklessly in exposing another to HIV if the HIV infected person
knew of their status before engaging in the sexual activity and the other person
was unaware of the condition or did not consent to the contact with bodily
fluids. 219 A conviction under the statute can also result if another person
provides corroborated evidence of sexual contact with the HIV infected person
after a determination of their HIV status, 22° as well as if an HIV infected
person subsequently tests positive for another venereal disease. 22' Violation of
the statute is a class D felony, 2 and is punishable by up to five years in
prison. 223 It becomes a class C felony if the actor is over the age of twenty-one
and the victim is under seventeen. 2 A class C felony is punishable by not
more than seven years in prison.
The Missouri statute was revised in 199722 to include the current
language prohibiting one from acting in a "reckless manner."'227 An earlier
version of the statute made it unlawful to "deliberately create a grave and
unjustifiable risk of infecting another with HIV.
,
This language,
215. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(1)(2) (West Supp. 2000).
216.

See id.

217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. § 191.677(1)(2)(a).
220. See id. § 191.677(l)(2)(c).
221. Id. § 191.677(1)(2)(b).
222. See id. § 191.677(2).
223. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 558.011(l)(4) (West 1999).
224. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 191.677(3) (West Supp. 2000).
225. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 558.011(1)(3) (West 1999).
226. See State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo. 1998).
227. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 191.677(1)(2) (West Supp. 2000).
228. See 1998 Mo. Legis. Serv. HB 1151 & 1044 (West). This language is not the first
attempt by Missouri in drafting its statute. The earliest version required only that the actor
expose another to HIV if the actor knew the other person might potentially become infected.
This was viewed as overly broad, and it was changed to the grave and unjustifiable risk

language. See Gene P. Schultz & Meg Reuter, AIDS Legislation in Missouri: An Analysis and

a Proposal,53 Mo. L. REv. 599, 624 (1988).
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according to the drafters, required a consideration of both the magnitude of the
risk created by the defendant's conduct, as well as the nature of the injury
risked. 29 These considerations are left to the jury to evaluate, which creates
the potential that some conduct which risks HIV transmission might be viewed
as having a different social value than other conduct.' To avoid creating a
"hierarchy of conduct," the statutory language was left intentionally broad."
The language may have been too broad, however, as the statute was challenged
23
as unconstitutionally vague for not giving fair notice of prohibited conduct.
Although the challenge failed, 3 it might have provided some impetus for the
recent change in the language. Arguably, however, the current wording is also
somewhat ambiguous and susceptible to challenge because it is likely to
involve a subjective interpretation of its meaning.
The current version of the Missouri statute reflects another recent
change. 2 ' The statute now requires that a defendant act "without the
knowledge and consent '"z' of the person exposed."' The earlier version of the
statute contained no language that made any exception for knowing and
3
7
consenting partners, and was challenged as overbroad for that reason.
8 the recent changes
Although the Missouri statute is arguably still imperfect,23
by the legislature do appear to be an improvement, and the newest version of
the statute is probably less vulnerable to constitutional attack.
K. NEVADA

The law in Nevada makes it a category B felony, punishable by a prison
term of two to ten years and/or a fine of not more than $10,000, for a person
to "intentionally, knowingly, or willfully [engage] in conduct in a manner that
is intended or likely to transmit [HIV] to another person." 239 The statute
includes a requirement that the person has tested positive for HIV and has
229. See Gene P. Schultz & Meg Reuter, AIDS Legislationin Missouri: An Analysis and
a Proposal,53 Mo. L. REV. 599, 626 (1988).

230.
231.

Id.
Closen, et al., supra note 18, at 954.

233.
234.
235.
236.
-237.

See id.
See State v. Bowens, 964 S.W.2d 232, 236 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 191.677(l)(2) (West Supp. 2000).
Id.
See Bowens, 964 S.W.2d at 236. The constitutional challenge was not considered

232.

See State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Mo. 1998).

because the defendant had failed to raise it at trial. Id
238. For example, the statute does not define "knowingly" and therefore suffers from

the same weaknesses of other statutes. See discussion of Illinois and Louisiana laws, supraparts
11 E, G.

239.

NEV.

REV.

STAT.

§ 201.205(1) (1997).
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received notice of that fact. u ° Nevada's statute makes it an affirmative defense
that the person exposed to the virus knew that the defendant was infected,
knew the conduct could result in exposure to HIV, and consented to the
conduct with that knowledge."
Nevada's HIV transmission statute does not contain many of the
weaknesses that undermine other statutes of its kind. First, there is no question
as to what it means to have knowledge of infection, as the statute specifically
states that a positive test is required, as well as actual notice of those test
results. 2 By further requiring that the test be one that is approved by the state
health board, it is likely that the test will have to include both steps of the HIV
testing regime, eliminating some of the dangers of false positives.
There is also no danger that the statute will be construed as prohibiting
conduct that carries no risk of HIV transmission, as it clearly covers only
conduct that does present a likelihood of transmission. u3 This makes the
statute less susceptible to charges of overbreadth that have undermined other
statutes. It is possible, however, that the Nevada law is too vague, as there is
no explanation or description of the types of conduct that are prohibited.
Arguably, if everyone is fully aware of exactly how HIV can be transmitted,
there is no need for further explanation. On the other hand, if the intention of
the drafters was to prohibit only conduct that has been medically proven to be
capable of transmitting the virus, the statute could have been drafted to say
this.
L. NEW JERSEY

New Jersey's law provides that it is a crime of the third degree for a
person, "knowing that he or she is infected with human immune deficiency
virus (HIV) or any other virus identified as a probable causative agent of
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), [to commit] an act of sexual
penetration without the informed consent of the other person."' A third
degree crime in New Jersey is punishable by between three and five years in
prison, a $7,500.00 fine, or both.2 5

240. See id.
241. See id. § 201.205(2)(a)-(c).
242. Id. § 201.205(1).
243. Id.
244. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b) (West Supp. 1999).
245. See notes of Assembly Judiciary Committee accompanying N.J.
2C:34-5 (West Supp. 1999).

STAT.

ANN.

§
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This provision marks a recent change in New Jersey's law.m A prior
version stated that a person who committed an act of sexual penetration
knowing that they were infected with a venereal disease was a "petty
disorderly person."' 7 The law was amended in 1997, increasing the penalty
for this offense to a crime of the fourth degree, and adding the HIV specific
provision as subsection (b).' A requirement of lack of informed consent by
the other person was also added.2 9
The statute provides no definition of sexual penetration, and arguably
could be interpreted as applying only to men.' A definition can be found
Sexual penetration is defined as
elsewhere in the New Jersey Code."
"vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse between persons,
or insertion of the hand, finger, or object into the anus or vagina either by the
actor or upon the actor's instruction." 2 This definition clearly makes the law
applicable to men and women.
It is very clear from this definition what constitutes sexual penetration
under New Jersey law. Unfortunately, the broad definition encompasses
conduct that presents no risk of HIV transmission. By including penetration
with a hand, finger, or object in the definition, the law is susceptible to
constitutional challenges of overbreadth. It appears to criminalize activities
that could not result in transmission of HIV or any sexually transmitted
disease." 3 The statute could be further construed as prohibiting certain
medical examinations.' While the New Jersey law clearly includes many
activities that do present a risk of HIV transmission, the broad definition
potentially creates the same constitutional problems that have undermined
other statutes of its kind.25

246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5 (West Supp. 1999) and accompanying Historical
and Statutory Notes.
249. See notes of Assembly Judiciary Committee accompanying N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:34-5 (West Supp. 1999).
250. See notes of Assembly Judiciary Committee accompanying N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:34-5 (West Supp. 1999).
251. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999).
252. Id.
253. See discussion of Arkansas law, supra part 1IA; discussion of Michigan law, supra
part I H. This definition presumably prohibits even the use of sex-toys by HIV positive people.
Id.
254. For example, a vaginal or rectal exam by an HIV-positive physician may be a crime
under the New Jersey definition. See discussion of Arkansas law, suprapart II A; Closen, supra
note 28, at 51.
255. See discussion of Arkansas law, supra part l A; discussion of Illinois law, supra
part II F.

2001l

STATE APPROACHES TO CRIMINALIZING THE EXPOSURE OF HIV

M. NORTH DAKOTA

North Dakota has enacted a statute that prohibits the transfer of body fluid
that may contain HIV.6 The statute classifies as a class A felony the willful
transfer of body fluid to another person by a person that knows they are
infected with HIV or afflicted with AIDS. 7 "Body fluid" is defined to
include semen, blood, or vaginal secretions. 258 A person commits the transfer
of body fluid by engaging in sexual activity involving genital-genital, oralgenital, or anal-genital contact. 9 It is an affirmative defense in North Dakota
if the transfer took place as a result of sexual intercourse between consenting
adults after disclosure of the risk and "with the use of an appropriate
prophylactic device."'
The North Dakota law contains the same level of uncertainty about its
knowledge requirement as that of other states." It simply states that the
defendant must know that they are afflicted with AIDS or infected with HIV.
The law could have been better drafted if it included a requirement of a
positive test or a clinical diagnosis of AIDS, or both. The statute does do a
good job, however, of describing what conduct is prohibited. It appears to
apply only to conduct that carries some risk of transmission, which makes
constitutional challenges of vagueness or overbreadth unlikely.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the North Dakota law is the
affirmative defense clause in subsection (3).12 Although similar to other states
in that it makes consensual activity after full disclosure an affirmative defense
to prosecution, North Dakota's statute contains an additional requirement that
an "appropriate prophylactic device" be used.6 3 Requiring use of a condom
might be viewed as adding an additional protection to the victim in addition
to consent, but when the possibility of condom failure is considered, this
provision is arguably of little help. It has been suggested that use of protective
measures should not be a defense because such measures cannot guarantee the
virus will not be transmitted.'

256. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (1997).
257. Id. § 12.1-20-17(2).
258. Id. § 12.1-20-17(l)(a).
259. Id. § 12.1-20-17(1)(b). Transfer may also involve permitting the reuse of a syringe,
needle, or other similar device without sterilization. Id
260. Id. § 12.1-20-17(3).
261. See discussion of Illinois and Louisiana laws, supra parts II F, H.
262. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(3) (1997).

263.
264.

Id.
See Closen & Deutschman, supranote 35, at 599-600.
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N. OKLAHOMA

In 1988, Oklahoma passed a statute that criminalizes the intentional

transfer of HIV.'

The Oklahoma law makes it a felony for any person that

knows they have AIDS or knows they are infected with HIV to "engage in
conduct reasonably likely to result in the transfer of the person's own blood,
bodily fluids containing visible blood, semen, or vaginal secretions into the
bloodstream of another... except during in utero transmission."26 The statute
requires that the person engaged in such conduct with intent to infect
another. 7 It further requires that the other person did not consent to the
transfer,"'8 or they consented to the transfer without being informed of the
other party's condition.' Conviction under the statute is punishable by up to
five years in prison.'
Much of the criticism of the Oklahoma statute focuses on the intent
requirement. 27' The statute states that the defendant must have acted with
"intent to infect another,"2 2 which places a burden on the prosecution to prove
to meet,273
the intent of the actor. Such a burden might be nearly impossible
and presents the same proof problems that occur with traditional criminal
statutes." 4 It has been suggested that the intent requirement needs to be
clarified, for example by requiring malice aforethought, or a depraved and
malignant heart," but the statute would be more consistent with those of other
states if the intent requirement were eliminated altogether.
The statute has also been criticized for its ambiguity in describing what
conduct is prohibited.2 7 By requiring that the conduct be "reasonably
likely" 2 " to transfer HIV, the statute arguably is restricted to activities that
have been medically proven to result in transmission.' It has been suggested,
however, that the language is "not sufficiently certain to warn people precisely
of which conduct is criminal and which is legal." 79 If the statute were more
265.
266.

267.

268.
269.
270.
271.

272.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See Leech, supra note 122, at 692.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. XXI, § 1192.1 (A) (West Supp. 2000).

See id.
See id. § 1192.1(A)(1).

See id. § 1192.1(A)(2).
See id. § 1192.1(B).
See, e.g., Leech, supra note 122, at 693-4; Decker, supra note 4, at 362.
OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. XXI, § 1192.1(A) (West Supp. 2000).
See Leech, supra note 122, at 695.
See Decker, supra note 4, at 362.
See Leech, supra note 122, at 710.
See Leech, supra note 122, at 699.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. XXI, § 1192.1(A) (West Supp. 2000).
See Decker, supra note 4, at 362.
See Leech, supra note 122, at 697.

20011

STATE APPROACHES TO CRIMINALMZING THE EXPOSURE OF HIV

carefully drafted to include the specific conduct that it prohibits, it might serve
to educate the public about the transmissibility of HIV,

° and

likelihood of challenges that it is unconstitutionally vague.

could reduce the

0. SOUTH CAROLINA

In South Carolina, it is a felony for a person who knows that he is
infected with HIV to knowingly engage in vaginal, anal, or oral sexual
intercourse with another person without informing that person of their
infection."' The statute also makes it unlawful for an HIV infected person to
forcibly engage in sexual intercourse without the consent of the other
person. 282 A conviction under the statute carries a fine of $5,000 or ten year
imprisonment. 283
Uncertainty regarding the knowledge requirement is also present in this
statute. The drafters have stated that the offending party must "know" that
with HIV, but have not explained how this knowledge should
they are infected
2
be obtained.

"

The South Carolina statute also refers only to HIV infection,

making no mention at all of those people that suffer from symptomatic
AIDS." Although it may be inferred that the statute is meant to apply to both
HIV and AIDS, it could have been drafted more precisely in this respect.
Another uncertainty in the South Carolina statute is found in subsection
(4), which states that it is unlawful to "forcibly engage in sexual intercourse
There is no explanation of
. .. without the consent of the other person."'
whether the requirement of consent refers to sexual intercourse or to exposure
to HIV.In using the word forcibly, which by definition implies that the sexual
intercourse was not consensual, the drafters might have intended the consent
requirement to apply to the exposure of HIV. However, that is not at all clear
from the way the law is drafted. Further, subsection (1) prohibits engaging in
sexual intercourse without informing the other person of one's HIV infection.
There is no stated requirement of consent here, but if the person was informed
of the other party's infection, but did not consent to the conduct, it is quite
possibly a situation not unlike subsection (4). This raises the question of
280. See id at 698.
281. S.C. CoDEANN. § 44-29-145(1) (West Supp. 1999).
282. Id. § 44-29-145(4).
283. See id. § 44-29-145(5).
284. Id. § 44-29-145.
285. Id.
286. Id. § 44-29-145(4). The entire provision reads: It is unlawful for a person who
knows that he is infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) to: (4) forcibly engage
in sexual intercourse, vaginal, anal, or oral, without the consent of the other person, including
one's legal spouse. Id.
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whether it is necessary for the statute to contain both provisions. Although the
statute is clear in describing which sexual acts it refers to, 7 the lack of clarity
regarding the consent requirement represents a major weakness in the South
Carolina law.
P. TENNESSEE

In Tennessee, a person commits the offense of criminal exposure to HIV
if they know that they are infected and engage in "intimate contact with
another, ' 21 or transfer blood, semen, "or other potentially infectious body
fluids
to another in any manner that presents a significant risk of HIV
transmission." 2" The statute defines "intimate contact" as exposing the body
of one to a bodily fluid of another in a manner that presents significant risk of
HIV transmission.' The statute does not require actual transmission of HIV
for a conviction, 29' and makes it an affirmative defense if the person exposed
to HIV knew of the other person's infection, knew the conduct could result in
infection, and gave advance consent.2'
This statute is very similar to the one in place in Illinois and Iowa, 293 but
does contain several differences in its definitions that make it clearer and
somewhat more skillfully drafted. First, Tennessee describes the offense as
criminal exposure of HIV,2'9 which is perhaps a more accurate description
considering that the actual transmission of the virus is not required. Second,
while the Illinois and Iowa definition of intimate contact includes acts that
"could result in transmission,"' 5 the Tennessee statute includes only those that
"present a significant risk of HIV transmission."' 9 This change potentially
narrows the types of conduct that fall under the definition and makes the
statute less vulnerable to misapplication. Finally, while Illinois and Iowa

287. It is specifically stated that vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse is prohibited. Id. §
44-29-145(1), (4).
288. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109(a)(1) (1997).
289. Id. § 39-13-109(a)(2).
290. ld. § 39-13-109(b)(2).
291. Id. § 39-13-109(d).
292. Id. § 39-13-109(c).
293. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (1997) with 720 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/12-16.2 (West 1998) and IOWA CODE § 709C.1 (1999).
294. CompareTENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (1997) with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/12-16.2 (West 1998). Illinois refers to it as criminal transmission. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/12-16.2 (West 1998).
295. 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(b) (West 1998); IOWA CODE § 709C. l(1)(b)
(1999).
296. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109(b)(2) (1997).

20011

STATE APPROACHES TO CRIMINALJZING THE EXPOSURE OF HIV

prohibit any transfer of a body fluid, 297 Tennessee restricts this to transfer in
a manner that presents significant risk of transmission. 9 This is a significant
change that helps eliminate the danger that the Tennessee law will be applied
to conduct that carries no risk of transmission, unlike the broad interpretation
that is possible with the other laws. 99 Despite this more narrow language,
however, the Tennessee law has been used to charge people for spitting at or
biting another person," even though saliva carries an extraordinarily low risk
of transmission." '
Ill. VERTICAL TRANSMISSION

One of the most significant criticisms of HIV criminal transmission
statutes is the possibility that the laws might be applied to the vertical
transmission of HIV, such as from mother to child through pregnancy. 3°2
Although none of the statutes specifically states that perinatal transmission is
prohibited, the vague wording of some statutes leaves open the possibility of
such transmission being a criminal offense. 3 Thus, in several states, it is
possible to prosecute a woman for transmitting the virus to her unborn fetus
through the placenta or after birth before the umbilical cord has been cut.
For example, the Illinois definition of intimate contact applies to all
transfers of body fluids that can result in transmission. This could include
transmission resulting from maternal blood transferred in utero to a fetus. I
Although HIV transmission in this manner occurs in a minority of HIV
cases,"' it is a possible means of transmission that could be a felony under
Illinois law. I Because the Illinois law contains a separate section defining
intimate contact, it is construed that intimate contact is not synonymous with

297. See 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(2) (West 1998); IOWA CODE
§ 709C. l(2)(b).
298. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109(a)(2) (1997).
299. See discussion of Illinois law, supra part II F.
300. See Beth Warren, HIV-Positive Woman Could Face More Charges, THE

TENNESSEAN, April 15, 1998, at 5B.
301. Id. (quoting Dr. David W. Haas, Director of the AIDS Clinical Trials Center at
Vanderbilt University Medical Center).
302. See generallyScott H. Isaacman, Are We Outlawing MotherhoodforHIV-Infected
Women?, 22 Loy. U. CM. L. J. 479 (1991) (discussing potential for HIV laws to criminalize
pregnancy for HIV positive women).
303.
304.
305.

See id.
See id. at 480.
See Andre A. Panossian et al., Criminalizationof PerinatalHIV Transmission, 19
J.LEGALMED. 223, 247 (1998).
306. See Isaacman, supra note 298, at 480.
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sexual contact." 7 Intimate contact, therefore, includes non-sexual contact. 3°8
Transplacental exposure is non-sexual contact that exposes one person to
bodily fluids of another person, and such exposure can result in transmission
of IFV.' Vertical transmission satisfies the statutory language in Illinois, 310
and could invoke criminal penalties.
The very similar statute in Iowa presents the same possibility that it might
also be applied to an HIV-infected pregnant woman. Although Iowa requires
that the exposure be intentional,3 ' this is arguably of little help when
considering the law's applicability to in utero transmission. If an HIV-positive
woman carries a pregnancy to term and gives birth, she has committed an
intentional exposure of bodily fluid. Therefore, vertical transmission also
satisfies the statutory language in Iowa.31 2
In Tennessee, vertical transmission from mother to child might also be a
felony if it is considered to present a significant risk of HIV transmission. 313
Possible criminalization of perinatal HIV transmission is also a concern in
Arkansas.3 4 The Arkansas statute fails to explain what is meant by the words
parenteral transfer of blood, 35 and it could be construed as applying to the
transfer from mother to child.31 '
Though it might seem "inconceivable that states could have intended to
criminalize motherhood," 317 such a result is possible based on the wording of
some of these statutes. Since no specific exception for vertical transmission is
included in most of the statutes, two possibilities exist. The legislatures might
have considered the extension of liability to pregnancy, and by their silence
implicitly approved such liability. 318 It is also possible that the legislatures
never contemplated that such a law could prohibit pregnancy and childbirth by
HIV-infected women. 3t9
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 486.
Id.
See Heather Sprintz, The Criminalization of PerinatalAIDS Transmission, 3
HEALTH MATRIX J. L. MED. 495, 507 (1993).
310. See Isaacman, supra note 298, at 480.
311. IowACODE § 709C.1(2)(b) (1999).
312. Id.
313. TENN. CODEANN. § 39-13-109(b)(2) (1997).
314. See Closen, supra note 28, at 50.
315. See id. Parenteral is generally defined in medical dictionaries as a transfer by some

other means than through the intestinal canal. ld.

316. See id at 50.
317. Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, Criminally Pregnant,A.B.A. J., Dec.
1998, at 78.

318. See Sprintz, supra note 305, at 508.
319. This possibility seems very real in Illinois. The legislature apparently received no
input from health professionals during the drafting, and the sponsor states that the primary
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Either way, the potential application of HIV criminal transmission
statutes to pregnancy carries significant constitutional and societal
implications. A woman that is HIV positive and transfers the virus to her
unborn child might be charged with a felony when the child is bom. 2 Thus,
some of the IV transmission statutes arguably are encouraging abortion,32'
as an IV positive woman's "only options are to... abort any pregnancy, or
to violate the law." 3" By leaving women with only two choices-giving up
their child through abortion, or having the child and risking prosecution, some
HIV-transmission statutes are unconstitutionally imposing upon a woman's
reproductive freedom. 3 A state cannot constitutionally prohibit the use of
contraceptives,324 marriage," or abortion. 3 ' By prohibiting a woman from
having a child, as these laws implicitly do, states are also implicating the
constitutional right to privacy. Although there is certainly a compelling interest
in preventing the intentional sexual and drug-related transmission of H[V, laws
that impinge upon a woman's right to bear children are not narrowly tailored
to this interest, and do not withstand strict scrutiny. 27
These constitutional problems might have been a consideration in the
drafting of Oklahoma's law, the only HIV-transmission statute that provides
a specific exception for transfer or exposure of HIV that occurs "during in
utero transmission of blood or bodily fluids."'3" By including this exception,
the Oklahoma law avoids the potential application to perinatal transmission
and, at least in this respect, is better drafted and less controversial than many
of its counterparts.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY PROPOSAL

It is clear that many of the state statutes relating to HIV transmission
contain serious flaws that create doubt as to their meaning and undermine the
overall effectiveness of the statute as a means of preventing risky behavior and
controlling the spread of HIV-AIDS. As a result, there have been several
purpose of the law was to respond to HIV-infected prostitutes who continued to work.
lsaacman, supra note 298, at 485 n. 43.
320. Sprintz, supra note 305, at 508.
321. See Closen, supra note 28, at 50.

322.

323.
324.
438 (1972).
325.
326.
327.
328.

See Isaacman, supra note 298, at 489.

See Sprintz, supra note 305, at 518-19.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 477 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Isaacman, supra note 298, at 492-93.
OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. XXI, § 1192.1(A) (West Supp. 2000).
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alternative statutes proposed that eliminate many of the problems.329 An HIV
specific transmission statute such as the following might prove more effective
and less controversial than many of the current state approaches:330
A.

B.

A person commits felony 331 criminal exposure of HIV
when such person is knowingly infected with HIV, as
a result of a confirmed positive test for HIV, or has
received a medical diagnosis of symptomatic AIDS,
and:
1. engages in sexual conduct with another person in
a manner which has been medically proven to be
a viable means of transfer of HIV; or
2. transfers, donates, sells, or provides to another
person his or her blood, semen, breast milk,
organs or other body tissues via transfusion,
transplantation, insemination, or feeding;332 or
3. dispenses, delivers, sells, or exchanges with
another person any non-sterile, potentially
infectious, hypodermic syringe, needle, or similar
device.333
Definitions:
1. "HIV" means the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus or any other identified causative agent of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
2. "Sexual conduct" shall include penetration or
insertion with the male sex organ into the vagina

329. See, e.g. David Robinson, Jr.,AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches
and a New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 91, 100 (1985); Closen & Deutschman,
supra note 35, at 597.
330. This proposal combines elements of the two alternatives proposed in supra note
325, with a few minor changes to improve it further. See, e.g. David Robinson, Jr., AIDS and
the Criminal Law: TraditionalApproaches anda New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFsTRA L.REV.
91, 100 (1985); Closen & Deutschman, supra note 34, at 597.
331. This is intended as a general alternative proposal that legislatures might look to for
guidance and therefore does not specify the degree of felony or the length of punishment that
a conviction would carry. To be consistent with most of the statutes currently in effect, the
punishment should likely range from ten to fifteen year imprisonment and/or the comparable
fine.
332. This provision is based on the one set forth in Closen & Deutschman, supra note
35, at 597, with slight modification.
333. This provision is adapted from those set forth in David Robinson, Jr., AIDS and the
Criminal Law: TraditionalApproaches anda New Statutory Proposal, 14 HoFSTRA L. REV. 91,
100 (1985); Closen & Deutschman, supra note 35, at 597.
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C.

D.
E.

or anus of another person, as well as oral-genital
intercourse.
It is an affirmative defense if: (1) the person exposed to
HIV gave informed consent to the conduct after
receiving actual knowledge that the other person was
infected with HIV, or (2) that the exposed person was
already infected with HIV prior to the conduct. It shall
not be an affirmative defense under this section that the
conduct took place with the use of a prophylactic
device, if the person exposed did not give informed
consent to the conduct.
This section shall not apply to any transfer that may
occur as a result of in utero transmission between
mother and child."
It is not required that an actual infection with HIV has
occurred in order for a person to be charged with
felony criminal exposure of HIV.

A statute drafted in this way would eliminate some of the problems found
with the other statutes. This alternative prohibits only conduct that is medically
proven to transmit HIV, eliminating any risk that it may be applied to conduct
that does not carry any risk of transmission. It also contains a definition that
identifies all conduct that is prohibited, to reduce doubt as to what the
medically proven modes of transmission are. The section relating to transfers
of bodily fluids via transfusion or transplantation is confined only to bodily
fluids that contain LIV and are known to transmit it. Saliva and tears are
excluded because, although the virus has been cultured from both,335 they have
not been shown to present a viable threat of infection. 3 This, too, will
eliminate the potential for overly broad applications that are possible with
some of the current statutes.137 Breast milk is included because it contains HIV
and is known to transmit it. 338 This proposal is less vulnerable to constitutional
attack because it is narrowly drafted to include only proven modes of
transmission.

334. This provision would incorporate the Oklahoma exception for perinatal
transmission. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. XXI, § 1192. 1(A) (West Supp. 1998).
335. ARTHUR S. LEONARD, ET AL, AIDS LAW AND Poucy 24 (2d ed. 1995).
336. See id.; David Robinson, Jr., AIDS and the CriminalLaw: TraditionalApproaches
and a New Statutory Proposal,14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 91, 103 (1985).
337. See discussion of Illinois law, supra part II F.
338. See Closen & Deutschman, supra note 35, at 593.
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The proposal provides for an affirmative defense if the exposed person
was already infected with HIV, which improves upon the Arkansas statute that
allows for a person to be charged under the law even if their victim is already
infected with HIV 39 It also provides for an affirmative defense if the
exposure occurred between knowing and consenting partners. This would
reduce some of the burden on the prosecution that exits with laws that require
the prosecution to prove the lack of consent.3" This alternative proposal does
not make the use of a condom or other protective device an affirmative defense
absent the informed consent of the victim. Such measures cannot guarantee
that HIV will not be transmitted, 34' and should not be considered a substitute
for full disclosure and consent among partners.
The proposal contains a specific exception for exposure resulting from in
utero transmission, eliminating any risk that it might be construed to apply to
vertical transmission of HIV. This is similar to the clause in Oklahoma's
statute. Some alternative proposals make it an affirmative defense that the
person exposed was exposed through in utero transmission. 2 Such a provision
is clearly better than many of the current statutes that arguably are
criminalizing motherhood, 3 but by including the in utero exception as an
affirmative defense, there remains the possibility that HIV-positive pregnant
women will be charged under the law. Although they could not be convicted
under the statute, a clause stating that the law is inapplicable to cases of in
utero transmission would eliminate the possibility of any charges being
brought at all. This proposal would be more constitutionally sound.
Finally, this alternative proposal specifically requires a confirmed
positive test or a medical diagnosis of AIDS, reducing much of the uncertainty
that is often found in the knowledge components of some BIW transmission
statutes. The proposal remains consistent with most other HIV-specific statutes
in that it does not contain an intent element and does not require that actual
transmission of HIV occur. This will eliminate many of the proof problems
that might arise as a result of such provisions.
CONCLUSION
It is not disputed that states have a great interest in helping to control the
spread of Hi-AIDS. One of the most important ways of controlling the
339. See discussion of Arkansas law, suprapart IIA.
340. See discussion of California and Georgia laws, supra parts II B, D.
341. See Closen & Deutschman, supra note 35, at 600.
342.
343.

Id. at 598.
See discussion of vertical transmission, supra part III.
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spread of the disease is to reduce the risky behaviors that are most likely to
result in transmission of the virus. It is widely believed that traditional criminal
approaches are not the most effective means of doing so. As a result, many
states are enacting HIV-specific statutes designed to control the spread of HIV
by providing severe penalties for engaging in conduct that can spread the
virus. Although the idea behind drafting these statutes might have been sound,
the result is far from perfect. Instead of being carefully drafted to prohibit only
conduct that carries a risk of transmission, several of the laws are written to
apply to forms of contact that present no risk at all of transmitting HIV.
Several statutes have also generated a great deal of controversy because of the
potential that they might be used to prosecute HIV-positive women who
become pregnant and carry the pregnancy to term. Although some of the laws
have survived constitutional challenges, still others appear susceptible to such
challenges. While criminalizing the exposure of HIV through HIV-specific
transmission statutes is not in itself a bad idea, the state efforts at doing so
need improvement. In drafting this type of statute legislators should more
closely consider what the purpose of the law is, and narrowly draft it to suit
this purpose. Vaguely written laws that leave confusion about what conduct
is prohibited need to be re-drafted to better define the scope of the law, and
provisions that include conduct that presents no risk of HIV transmission need
to be eliminated. Health care professionals should be involved in the drafting
process to help ensure that proper attention is given to the proven modes of
transmission. More carefully drafted laws could eliminate much of the
controversy surrounding the criminalization of HIV-transmission, and would
be more effective in controlling the spread of the virus.

